COMMUNICATION
(179) Reliable and accurate communication and dissemination of information is a key element for successful radiological protection efforts in the aftermath of a radiological attack. Many recommendations are available in the open literature for this purpose (e.g., ANS, 2003; US DHS, 2003b; Van Tuyle et al., 2003) , and the Commission recommends that national authorities to refer to the available reference material in establishing their communication strategies.
(180) Professional public information personnel should be involved to gather, process, and rapidly disseminate information on both the incident and the response efforts, including complex technical data. A credible and successful communications programme for consequence management should begin with the fundamental objectives of communicating approaches to risk reduction and enabling those affected by the disaster to comprehend its scope and make informed decisions. Such a programme should disseminate timely, accurate, clear, and consistent information without creating unwarranted fear. The emergency planners and responders must recognise the short-and long-term information needs of the public, media, and response forces, and incorporate that understanding in their plans and actions.
(181) In the early hours and days of the response, communicators will be challenged to get crucial technical information out to the public quickly and in easyto-understand language. Release of radiological information must be concurrent with protective action guidance. Lack of information only adds to fear and speculation. Basic information should be provided on the amount of radiation or radionuclide contamination and areas affected, even if it is qualified as early estimates. The time between information acquisition, packaging, and release can be critical.
(182) The information personnel will give guidance regarding whether not to inform or to inform, and, if so, how to inform. On the one hand, informing the public may have several advantages: recognition and avoidance of the hazard; creation of a public network for notification of a malicious act; better chance of avoidance; and better probability of apprehending the perpetrators of the act. On the other hand, too much information too early may cause undue anxiety. In a controlled information strategy, consideration should be given to the needs, limitations, and other factors that influence how the different target audiences view risks, and thereby how able they are to accept the information.
(183) Therefore, media and public information planning must consider the possibility of radiological malicious attacks. Preparedness for radiological attacks should be based on existing arrangements for responding to other types of attack, with special consideration given to the need for establishing clear guidelines on when and how such information should be provided to the media and the public.
(184) It is vital to establish a good working relationship with the media before the onset of a radiological attack. To achieve such a relationship, it is necessary to involve media personnel to plan for the interaction in the event. Involvement of information and the media in simulations and exercises also helps to improve confidence in the response.
ANNEX A: POTENTIAL SCENARIOS
A.1. Malicious intent (A1) Radioactive material could be used, in blackmail, or the blackmailer could threaten to use such material. The perpetrator would not even have to have the material to attempt such an ÔattackÕ. An intent to commit a radiological attack that does not materialise differs from all other potential scenarios in that there is no actual radiological impact. The motivation could be financial benefit, extortion, blackmail, or to create physical or psychological harm. Nevertheless, if the threat is considered serious enough, this situation is in itself a radiation emergency, which requires special provisions to identify, classify, and assess the situation as well as to respond in order to prevent and/or minimise the potential impact of the act should it occur. If information or intelligence on intent is available, the responsible authorities should be prepared to implement the preplanned measures.
A.2. Unannounced events (A2) Some scenarios for a radiological attack are based upon a covert exposure or dispersal of radioactive material. The first indication that an event has materialised may be people reporting to hospital with symptoms of radiation illness, burns, or other symptoms. Therefore, medical planning should include information for physicians and facilities on radiation exposure symptoms, and the establishment of an effective and centralised monitoring network that is aware of the need for early reporting of any patient suffering from injuries that may have been caused by exposure to ionising radiation.
A.3. Thefts
(A3) Radioactive material may be stolen, either for a perceived financial benefit or as a possible precursor to a malicious attack. In any case, these acts should be assessed to determine if they might represent a credible threat and, if so, increase preparedness and/or plan a response to apprehend the perpetrators before a malicious attack (IAEA, 2002d) . Public announcements of the hazard of dangerous sources may sometimes lead to intelligence resulting in retrieval of the stolen sources. It should be mentioned that public announcements may also produce anxiety and that authorities should be prepared. It should be kept in mind that it is equally possible that quasi ÔlegitimateÕ businesses might be established and radioactive material thus obtained and used maliciously.
A.4. Radiation exposure devices (A4) Unsecured radiation sources can be used to perpetrate a deliberate act to irradiate a person or persons. This type of emergency may focus upon a single individual, a target group, or it may be designed to attack individuals at random. The possibilities may include, for example, concealing an unshielded radioactive source in the clothing, luggage, home, workplace, or vehicle of target individuals or in a place frequented by the public or on public transport. The main consequences of such a malicious act include: fatalities or casualties suffering from the effects of radiation exposure; possible radioactive contamination of the location where the radioactive materials were concealed; and the generation of public fear leading to the disruption of the economic, transport, and medical infrastructures.
A.5. Radioactive dispersion devices
(A5) The detonation of conventional explosives shrouding an ordinary radioactive source, such as those commonly used in medicine and industry, has been dubbed in the press as a Ôdirty bombÕ, but may be more properly referred to as an RDD. Furthermore, the dispersion of radioactive material into the environment may be achieved without explosives, by opening the source container if the material is dispersible, or processing the source to make it dispersible.
(A6) The main hazard from an explosive RDD is from the direct effects of the blast. The consequences that are directly due to the explosive nature of the RDD include: buildings collapsing and trapping people; fire in the immediate vicinity of the explosion; dead or injured people from the effects of the blast and from fragmentation; and disruption to power, gas, and water supplies and communication links within the immediate area. The main radiological consequences are likely to be inhalation or inadvertent ingestion of radioactive contamination within the immediate environs of the incident, and the possibility of direct exposure from fragments of the source remaining in the immediate vicinity of the explosion. In fact, in most cases, the radioactive material will be in the immediate vicinity of the explosion, so direct exposure from the remaining source and source fragments will be important pathways. Downwind, people, vehicles, and other objects in the immediate vicinity may become contaminated with radioactive materials and there is the possibility that contamination may spread beyond the immediate area. The radiological consequences can be extremely variable depending on the nature and amount of the radionuclides involved. In comparison with conventional bomb attacks, there are additional hazards for emergency response personnel, who may be irradiated or contaminated with radioactive materials unless they are equipped with radiation detection equipment to warn them of the radiological hazards.
A.6. Site-specific radioactive contamination (A7) Another scenario is a deliberate act to contaminate a specific site or environment with radioactive materials. The consequences of such an event may include: the long-term loss of use of the site, facility, or businesses; disruption of key infrastructures; and widespread public alarm or distress. The culprits may attempt to use radioactive materials in such a way that it becomes impossible to recover the use of the site without demolition and removal of building debris. Possible methods include: the introduction of radioactive materials into air-conditioning systems or ven-tilation systems; the use of a vehicle to transport a ÔleakingÕ container which streams radioactive materials behind the vehicle; and the use of a high-rise building to disperse radioactive materials into the air, using normal air currents to disperse the materials.
(A8) As demonstrated by the accident in Goiânia, Brazil (IAEA, 1988) , the dispersion of even a relatively limited amount of radioactive material can lead to significant contamination of an area. The main radiological consequences may include: widespread radioactive contamination of the site; fatalities or casualties suffering from exposure to radiation, especially if the situation is not immediately recognised or people intake significant quantities of radioactive materials; and movement of people, objects, or vehicles contaminated with radioactive materials away from the site, causing spread of radioactive contamination.
A.7. Radioactive contamination of food and water supplies (A9) Yet another scenario for a radiological attack is the contamination of food or water supplies with radioactive materials. This centres the attack on the ingestion pathway, where the aims may be to: expose the public who consume the contaminated food or drink the contaminated water; stop the provision of food or water supplies to the public; and cause widespread distress and public alarm. The radiological consequences may include: contamination of water treatment plants, service reservoirs, header tanks, and water supply systems; contamination of food products, wholesale food markets, supermarkets, or food-processing facilities; and the loss or disruption of the water and/or food supply chain. Examples of this scenario using chemicals rather than radiation include the contamination of the pharmaceutical product Tylenol -in 1982, seven people in the Chicago area died after taking Tylenol capsules that had been deliberately contaminated with cyanide (Wolnik et al., 1984) . The occurrence of immediate fatalities or casualties suffering from the effects of radiation exposure via the ingestion pathway is very unlikely since extremely large amounts of radioactive material would be required to achieve sufficiently high concentrations and, even if this were to occur, it is very unlikely that it would affect a large number of people.
A.8. Attacking nuclear facilities (A10) An important scenario is an attack on, or sabotage of, safety-related systems at nuclear facilities holding large inventories of radioactive materials, including nuclear fission and activation products and radioactive wastes. A well-planned attack on these types of facilities, which encompass nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear-fuel reprocessing plants, and radioactive waste management installations, may conceivably result in significant discharges of radioactive materials into the environment. Moreover, if the attack disrupts a facility that is able to sustain a nuclear reaction, an uncontrolled release of energy could conceivably occur, which can lead to significant discharges of fission products. It should be noted, however, that sophisticated safety systems are usually in place at these facilities to prevent radioactive discharges into the environment even following serious accidents. In particular, nuclear power and research reactors as well as other fuel cycle facilities used in civilian applications usually have emergency systems in place to prevent radioactive discharges during an accident, which can greatly reduce the potential for radioactive effluents to be released outside the facility in case of an attack.
(A11) The Commission presumes that any operating nuclear installation has in place both: (i) strict security measures that would make a successful radiological attack unlikely; and (ii) radiation emergency arrangements that are based on its previous ad-hoc recommendations (ICRP, 1991b) . The technicalities of the radiation emergency at such facilities may not differ substantially from that expected and planned for as part of their existing emergency response.
A.9. Improvised nuclear devices (A12) Finally, an extreme but possible scenario is the diversion of nuclear materials, particularly special fissionable materials 6 (such as 235 U and 239 Pu), and the development, construction, and use of a crude nuclear weapon, usually known as an IND. Even if the IND yield were low, the blast would have devastating consequences. Moreover, such an event would scatter massive amounts of radioactive fission products into the environment. Significantly, a low-yield IND will disperse the unburned fissile material.
ANNEX B: MEDICAL ISSUES
B.1. Planning for public health and medical intervention B.1.1. Threat of a radiological attack (B1) Planning the medical response to the threat of a radiological attack is no different than for other types of attack, e.g. chemical or biological attack. In particular, the standard procedures for managing persons accidentally contaminated with radionuclides are applicable (NCRP, 1980) . Depending on the planning arrangements made by local authorities, medical facilities may receive a notice that some type of threat has been made so that they can be prepared if the event actually occurs. As long as the threat has not materialised, special medical provisions may not be needed.
B.1.2. Unannounced events
(B2) Some scenarios for a radiological attack are based upon a covert exposure or dispersal of radioactive material. The first indication that a covert radiological attack has occurred may be people reporting to hospital with symptoms of radiation illness, burns, or other symptoms. Therefore, medical planning should include advance information to physicians and facilities on radiation health effects so that symptoms of high radiation exposure can be recognised and proper treatment given. It is essential that efficient notification arrangements are in place so that a general response can be initiated rapidly to prevent further exposure. There may also be a need for the establishment of an effective and centralised monitoring network for the early reporting of any patient suffering from injuries that may have been caused by exposure to ionising radiation.
B.1.3. Irradiation
(B3) The most challenging situation, from a medical perspective, is the possibility that a very large number of people may have been unknowingly exposed to ionising radiation and that radioactive material may be dispersed throughout the population. If the identities of the potentially exposed individuals are known, and if the number is small, existing national medical infrastructures for dealing with radiological or nuclear emergencies should be sufficient. However, the number of potentially exposed individuals may overwhelm the existing capabilities and there may be a need to screen large segments of the population. Furthermore, the public distress generated by the news could overwhelm the existing infrastructure. Part of the challenge comes from the fact that many prodromal symptoms of high radiation overexposure are the same as those of conventional illness, such as nausea and diarrhoea. For low radiation exposures, no physical symptoms will be present, potentially leading everyone to believe that they have been exposed. Planning efforts must, therefore, recognise the need: (i) to establish a national network of institutions with various degrees of capabilities in the identification and treatment of overexposed individuals; (ii) to co-operate closely with radiological experts to set up a system of contamination monitoring for a large number of potentially contaminated people; (iii) for mass triage procedures for potentially overexposed individuals; (iv) for all medical specialists to speak with a harmonised voice regarding the potential health impacts; (v) to co-operate with media organisations to inform people on what to do and where to go so that the medical infrastructure is properly utilised; and (vi) to avert mass panic.
B.1.4. Contamination of food and water supplies
(B4) This type of event is unlikely to lead to significant internal contamination of a large number of people due to the enormous quantities of radioactive material that would be required to reach high levels of contamination in massproduced or distributed supplies. However, as past experience has demonstrated (e.g. cyanide contamination of extra-strength Tylenol, 1982), public concern generated by such an act could present a significant challenge to the authorities. Although it is unlikely (although not impossible) that there would be a need for emergency monitoring of a large number of people for internal contamination, there is a need to co-operate with radiological experts and media specialists to quickly assess the potential medical impact of such acts and provide public information to alleviate fears in the potentially affected public. There is also a need to develop a plan, at national level, to monitor a representative sample of the potentially affected population to confirm the health risk assessment and reassure the public.
B.1.5. Radioactive dispersion devices
(B5) This type of emergency could occur anywhere, and it is necessary to have a national network of medical services capable of dealing with the radiological nature of this type of event. In addition, plans must recognise the security aspects of the emergency and the need to work in close co-operation with security forces. However, this is not fundamentally different from the type of planning required to deal with any conventional accident involving explosive and/or chemical hazards, be they of an accidental or criminal nature.
B.1.6. Attack upon a nuclear facility (B6) Assuming that medical planning and preparedness measures have been made for response to nuclear facility emergencies, this type of event should not require any substantive additional planning. Although the cause may be different (deliberate vs random accident), the medical consequences would be roughly the same as those that should be envisaged in the existing plans. B.2. Relevant information for immediate medical prognosis and initial treatment of radiation effects attributable to external radiation (B7) This section presents relevant information for immediate medical prognosis and treatment of the effects from external radiation that may arise from a radiological attack. Although this type of information should correctly be presented in terms of the absorbed dose and therefore expressed in grays, following the considerations in Paragraph e of the Executive Summary, doses in the following tables will be expressed as whole body doses in millisieverts for purposes of simplification. It should be noted that this simplification does not present serious problems in cases of low-LET radiation, such as gamma and beta radiation. However, if high-LET external radiation is involved, such as in an IND, the information in the tables is not applicable. Table B .1 presents the prodromal phase of acute radiation syndrome; Table  B .2 presents the change of lymphocyte counts in the initial days of acute radiation syndrome depending on the dose of acute whole body exposure; Table B .3 presents the latent phase of acute radiation syndrome; Table B .4 presents the findings of the critical phase of acute radiation syndrome following whole body exposure; Table B .5 presents the principal therapeutic measures for acute radiation syndrome according to degree; and Table B .6 presents the time of onset of clinical signs of skin injury depending on the dose received (adapted from IAEA, 1998d).
B.3. Therapies for internal contamination
(B8) The procedures recommended for the treatment of people with acute internally deposited radioactive materials are intended to reduce the radiation dose and hence the risk of possible future effects which might alter their health. These aims can be accomplished by the use of two general processes: (i) reduction of absorption and internal deposition; and (ii) enhanced elimination or excretion of incorporated radionuclides. Both are more effective when commenced as soon as possible after exposure. Therefore, the most important considerations in treatment are selection of the proper drug for the given radionuclide, and timely administration after exposure. Depending upon the radionuclides used in case of a radiological attack, the main available medical procedures include: (i) blocking, diluting, and dis- Mild (1000-2000) Moderate (2000-4000) Severe (4000-6000) Very severe (6000-8000) Lethal (>8000) Lymphocytes (10 9 /l) (days 3-6) Stable iodine (B9) A blocking agent saturates the metabolic process in a specific tissue with a stable element, thereby reducing the uptake of the radionuclide. Administration of stable iodine is a practical measure for preventing or reducing the uptake of inhaled and/or ingested radioactive isotopes of iodine; it is described as a protection of the public in Chapter 5. After an intake of radioactive iodine, the concentration in the thyroid reaches 50% of the maximum within about 6 h and the maximum in 1-2 days in a healthy adult. Thus, to obtain the maximum reduction of the radiation dose to the thyroid, stable iodine should be administered before any intake of radioactive iodine or as soon as practicable thereafter. If stable iodine is administered within the 6 h preceding the intake of radioactive iodine, the protection provided is about 98%; it is about 90% if stable iodine is administered at the time of uptake. Its efficiency decreases with time elapsed since uptake, but radioactive iodine in thyroid can still be reduced to about 50% if stable iodine is administered within 4-6 h after inhalation. A single iodine tablet provides efficient protection for about 36 h after its administration. In most cases of an attack, it will be difficult to anticipate and perform a distribution of iodine tablets before the malicious contamination of the environment; this is why the decision to distribute the prophylactic drug and its distribution should be done as quickly as feasible. Difficulties to meet these obligations are directly related to the number and geographic distribution of people who need to be treated. The decision regarding whether and how stable iodine should be made available is one that has to be taken at the stage of developing emergency plans. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that, contrary to emergency plans in case of an accident occurring in a nuclear installation, the identification of the population at risk of a radiological attack will be very difficult and subject to large uncertainties; these parameters will make any attempt to distribute stable iodine to large populations after a malicious attack highly problematic, except if the target of the attack is a nuclear installation or an IND. This is why national authorities should consider other means of protection, such as evacuation or sheltering. (B10) The recommended dosage of stable iodine to adult members of the public is a single dose of 100 mg (which corresponds to 130 mg of KI or 170 mg of potassium iodate); this dosage should be reduced to 50 mg for pregnant women and children between 3 and 12 years of age, and to 25 mg for children under 3 years of age. The risks associated with the administration of stable iodine to members of the public in a single dose of 100 mg are very small in countries with a high dietary iodine intake, but increase in countries and areas where there is marked iodine deficiency in the diet. The risk of side effects is relatively small to the very young, whilst it is somewhat higher for the elderly.
(B11) Intervention levels for the administration of stable iodine are discussed in Chapter 5. The Commission states that this intervention will almost always be justified when a dose of 500 mSv (or more) to the thyroid will be averted, and adds that an optimised level will be lower but not more than a factor of 10, i.e. 50 mSv. The BSS recommend an optimised intervention level corresponding to an equivalent dose of 100 mSv. Anyhow, these two recommendations are generally coherent. This report uses the 100-mSv level as its recommended guidance.
Dilution, displacement
(B12) Isotopic dilution is achieved by the administration of large quantities of the stable element that corresponds chemically to the radioactive element, e.g. a high level of water uptake that will increase the excretion of tritium. Displacement therapy is a special form of dilution therapy in which a non-radioactive element of a different atomic number successfully competes with the radionuclide for uptake sites. An example of a displacement agent is the administration of calcium to increase the urinary excretion of radioactive strontium. It is unlikely that these therapeutic means will be of significant use in case of a radiological attack given the radionuclides that are expected.
B.3.2. Reduction of gastrointestinal absorption
Prussian blue (B13) Gastrointestinal absorption can be reduced either by washing out or by the use of medications selected for specific radionuclides. These medications combine with the radionuclides so that absorption from the gastrointestinal tract is reduced and the radionuclides are eliminated in stools. One simple method is stomach lavage, which may be useful when, in an exceptional circumstance, an oral intake of a radionuclide is still in the stomach and would result into high doses. Ferric ferrocyanide, commonly named Prussian blue, is effective in accelerating the removal of caesium. Orally administered, Prussian blue traps caesium in the gut, interrupts its re-absorption from the gastrointestinal tract, and thereby increases faecal excretion. Prussian blue is essentially non-absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract and has low toxicity. Classical dosages of 3 g/day of Prussian blue can reduce the biological half-time of 137 Cs by a factor of 2-3. Prussian blue was used in the Goiânia accident in Brazil (1987) where several people ingested fatal and near-fatal levels of 137 Cs. This therapy is not usually recommended for those who have had intakes <1 ALI and is usually recommended for those with intakes >10 ALI. Prussian blue was not used for the general population in villages around Chernobyl that were contaminated by caesium. In that case, the lifetime population dose was estimated to be over 90% from external radiation due to caesium on the ground. Once food and water supplies were controlled, the lifetime dose to the general population from internal contamination was only of the order of 1-2%. Even if the general population had been treated with Prussian blue for the first 4 years post exposure, this would have reduced final exposure by less than 1%. Another problem with the use of Prussian blue for the general public with very low intakes of caesium is that, at the present time, there is an insufficient global supply of Prussian blue.
B.3.3. Chelating agents
(B14) Mobilising agents are compounds that increase the natural turnover process, thereby effectively eliminating radionuclides from body tissues. These agents are more effective when given soon after exposure, but some still produce an effect if given within a few days. Chelating agents may be considered to be a special class of mobilising agents. Chelation is a process by which organic compounds (ligands) exchange less firmly bonded ions for other inorganic compounds to form a relatively stable non-ionised ring complex. This soluble complex is excreted readily by the kidneys. A properly selected and administered chelating drug will therefore enhance the excretion of some specific radionuclides and thus reduce their residence times in the organism. Since chelating agents cannot penetrate into cells, their use is most effective when treatment is commenced immediately after exposure, while the radioactive material ions are still in circulation and before their incorporation within cells in target organs, such as bone and liver. DTPA is the most common form of chelating agent used in man, and has shown its effectiveness in the treatment of contamination by transuranics, such as plutonium, americium, and curium.
Diethylenetriaminepentaaceticacid (Ca-DTPA)
(B15) The calcium salt of diethylenetriaminepentaacetate (Ca-DTPA) is the most available form of DTPA. With repeat dosing, Ca-DTPA may deplete the body of zinc and, to a lesser extent, manganese and other trace elements. Zn-DTPA is the analogous zinc salt. Ca-DTPA and Zn-DTPA treatments are efficacious for treatment of internal contamination with soluble plutonium salts, such as the nitrates or chlorides (if in a pure chemical form), if treatment is instituted within several hours of intake. Doses can be reduced by up to 80%. These treatments are, however, ineffective in treating patients contaminated with highly insoluble compounds such as the high-fired oxides, or if the radioactive contamination is associated with other dusts. Prolonged treatment of people internally contaminated with poorly soluble plutonium often results in dose reductions of less than 20%. Ca-DTPA is thought to be more effective than Zn-DTPA for initial chelation of transuranics; therefore, Ca-DTPA should be used, especially in the initial phase, whenever larger intakes of transuranics are involved, unless contraindicated. Approximately 24 h after exposure, Zn-DTPA is as effective as Ca-DTPA. This comparable efficacy, coupled with its lesser toxicity, makes Zn-DTPA the preferred agent for protracted therapy. Ca-DTPA is contra-indicated for children, pregnant women, and patients with nephrotic syndrome or bone marrow depression. Zn-DTPA, if clinically indicated, could be administered to children and pregnant women in all trimesters, although insufficient data exist for both populations. As with Prussian blue, DTPA therapy is not advised for the general public with low or unspecified intakes. It is usually recommended for those with intakes >10 ALI and not for those with intakes of <1 ALI; between these values, there is a discretionary element where different actions may be taken depending on age, health, and likely efficacy of treatment. In most scenarios involving a radiological attack, the transuranics are likely to be in poorly soluble form. Also, at the present time, there is an insufficient global supply of Ca-DTPA and Zn-DTPA to respond to massive malicious events. Furthermore, some countries restrict the use of DTPA by limiting it to specified organisations or individuals. Other countries have yet to authorise DTPA for human use.
Sodium bicarbonate
(B16) Sodium bicarbonate is a useful medical treatment for people exposed to certain chemical forms of natural, depleted, or enriched uranium. Treatment with sodium bicarbonate produces a uranyl bicarbonate complex in tubular urine that is less nephrotoxic; this complex is stable in biological mediums and is eliminated rapidly by the kidneys. The chemical form and particle size of a uranium inhalation exposure are important factors in determining the clinical effectiveness of sodium bicarbonate treatment, but unless the uranium is enriched 235 U, the hazard is more chemical than radiological. For example, kidney damage, acute tubular necrosis, is possible from an exposure of about 4 mg of uranium because in the usual acid urine pH, the UO 2þ 2 ion binds to kidney tubules. Treatment of exposure to much lower levels of uranium is not warranted.
B.4. Therapies for external exposure
(B17) Medical treatment of patients with acute radiation syndrome starts with triage and immediate life-saving actions, if necessary. During the first day, treatment of whole body overexposure will be directed at symptoms and an attempt should be made to estimate the order of magnitude of the exposure and its distribution within the body, since these two parameters will allow a prognosis and, consequently, the nature of the most appropriate treatment. The dose, although there are marked inhomogenities in dose distribution in most cases, will provide a general guidance. The initial dose will be estimated through various means, such as presenting symptoms and laboratory evaluations (lymphocyte, granulocyte, and platelet counts). After whole body exposure to doses of 2000-15,000 mSv, bone marrow is the first organ that may cause death. Therefore, all efforts will be primarily directed to the restoration of its functions and, in some cases, to provide appropriate substitutes, such as transfusions of blood cells (essentially platelets and erythrocytes).
B.4.1. Prevention and treatment of infections
(B18) Whatever the type of treatment, the worse risk to the exposed person is the development of infections, localised or generalised, due to the loss of immune defences. The patient requires anti-infectious aggressive treatments. Prevention measures in immunocompromised patients are now well established and apply to these type of patients. The first step of the treatment is prevention of exogenous infection. Independently of current prophylactic measures, patient isolation is mandatory. The second step is the elimination of micro-organisms that normally exist in any patient. Administration of oral, non-absorbable antibacterials will preserve anaerobic bacteria. Antiviral agents will be prescribed in a prophylactic manner. Routine culturing of skin, body orifices, urine, and wounds, if existing, will allow prompt treatment with appropriate antibiotics if a fever develops.
B.4.2. Maintenance of fluid and electrolyte balance
(B19) Whole body exposure to doses in the lethal range will induce a severe malnutrition syndrome. Nutritional and caloric balance should be maintained, without waiting for the appearance of the first signs of imbalance. Caloric administration should be progressive and reach a plateau between 2000 and 3000 calories, while respecting equilibrium between proteins, glucides, and lipids. The volume of hydration depends on the loss related to diarrhoea, vomiting, gastric aspiration, and possible drainage. Without appropriate hydration, imbalance may cause the death of exposed people, e.g. after profuse vomiting or diarrhoea.
B.4.3. Specific treatments of bone marrow depression
(B20) When it can be expected that bone marrow will recover, either because the dose was not high enough to destroy all immature cells (including stem cells and progenitors) or because some territories of the marrow were protected (shielding of about 10% of the active bone marrow will allow survival of people with a dose around the LD 50/60 ), classical transfusions may be sufficient to avoid severe complications related to the transitory depression. When the bone marrow depression is expected to last for unacceptable periods of time or is too deep for a spontaneous recovery, other methods have been used, such as bone marrow transplantation, cytokines, cord blood transplantation, or stem cell transplantation.
Bone marrow transplantation
(B21) Bone marrow transplantation would initially seem to be a logical treatment when the dose has been sufficiently high to prevent spontaneous recovery. To date, survival of patients who have had bone marrow transplants after accidental radiation exposure is less than 5%. Bone marrow transplantation has very limited indications and only in the dose range >8000 mSv. Success will be highly compromised and some complications might be unavoidable, such as graft-vs-host disease (GVHD) which represents a great risk of death even without prevailing complicating associated parameters. Experience has confirmed that bone marrow transplantation has very little use in accidental overexposures; however, this may change if late multiorgan failure and other complications can be overcome.
Cytokines
(B22) Haematopoiesis is controlled by factors that act on growth and differentiation, and allow adaptation of the organism to new situations by consequently modulating its own response. Some of these factors are well identified and can be produced by biotechnology in sufficient quantities for their use in the treatment of aplasia. Granulocyte colony-stimulating factor (G-CSF) and granulocyte-macrophage colony-stimulating factor (GM-CSF) increase the rate of haematopoietic recovery and may obviate the need for a bone marrow transplantation, provided that some stem cells are still viable. Both factors have been used in radiation accidents during the past decades, and seemed to have some influence on both the length of the neutropenia period and the survival time; they have also been used in conjunction with bone marrow transplantation and seemed to have a favourable influence. They were often combined with another factor, interleukin-3 (IL-3), which affects the lymphoid system and acts in synergy with GM-CSF. These three factors have nonnegligible side effects, which include fever, headache, pains, and thrombocytopenia. Other haematopoietic growth factors are used in patients with bone marrow depression, including erythropoietin, thrombopoietin, IL-6, IL-11, and a fusion protein consisting of GM-CSF and IL-3 with a greater specific activity than either cytokine alone (PIX-321). Recently, the suggestion has been made to couple cytokines with the infusion of cultured immature cells, rich in stem cells and progenitors. This technique would allow transplantations with a lesser risk of GVHD and a quicker ÔtakingÕ of the transplant. However, it should be stressed that, at present, there is an insufficient supply of these cytokines to respond to multiple mass casualty that might conceivably occur following a radiological attack. Use of these medications for radiation-induced neutropenia after an attack would be Ôoff-labelÕ. Their use would require establishing protocols, institutional oversight, adequate monitoring, and informed consent procedures or adequate exceptions.
Fetal cord blood transplantation
(B23) The availability of a compatible transplant is often the major problem for bone marrow transplantation. The relative urgency related to the circumstances (accident or malicious attack), which prevent any preliminary planning, combined with unavoidable delays for finding the appropriate transplant may aggravate the situation. Fetal cord transplant provides the opportunity to escape from these problems. In addition, human umbilical cord blood is a viable source of stem cells and progenitor cells; lymphocytes are also mostly immature. The first cord blood transplantation was performed in 1988. When non-identical human leukocyte antigen (HLA) system transplantations were performed, very few reactions from the transplant, such as GVHD, were observed; since then, specific cord blood banks have been developed, which are particularly useful for rare HLA types. This type of transplantation has been reserved for children, although the number of stem cells in the transplant was sufficient for adults. The first cord blood transplantation used to try to save a highly exposed adult was performed in Japan after the Tokai Mura accident in 1999; the death of the person was not related to this particular treatment, but to multiple visceral complications and extended skin radiation injuries. His graft (chromosome XX) was rejected as the patientÕs own bone marrow (chromosome XY) regenerated.
(B24) Moreover, radiation levels that cause severe marrow damage or failure usually produce concomitant life-threatening injury to other organs, particularly the lungs and intestines. Care of patients or casualties who have radiation-induced marrow failure is complicated by these other injuries, and patients who recover marrow function frequently succumb to non-haematological injuries. To date, comparatively few transplants, if any, have been performed successfully for radiation casualties, and lethally irradiated patients receiving marrow or cord blood transplants have not demonstrated improved survival. As transplantation is a high-risk procedure, transplants should be performed in established transplant centres using donated marrow or stem cells from matched siblings, matched unrelated donors, or the best-available cord blood.
(B25) In summary, the role of marrow or stem cell transplantation in contingency response to radiation injury is currently limited. Due to the resilience of haematopoietic stem cells, the wide distribution of stem cells in the marrow, the ability of remaining stem cells to repopulate the entire haematopoietic system, and the likelihood of non-uniform radiation in accidental exposure, many individuals in the dose range of 4-8 Sv may recover haematopoiesis without a marrow transplant. Serious radiation injury to the lungs and other organs, as well as burns and physical trauma, will often be of greater consequence than marrow injury. However, marrow transplantation must be available for carefully selected casualties, and its future applicability may change as transplant procedures improve.
B.4.4. Radioprotective agents
(B26) Radioprotective agents have been of interest for both military and cancer therapy applications. A considerable number of drugs have been tested and Amifostine (Ethyol Ò ) is considered to be promising. These drugs need to be absorbed prior to the exposure. They give rise to important side effects such as hypotension, nausea, and vomiting which severely limits or precludes current use for first responders. Since there is no clinical evidence that radioprotective agents offer any protection if given after exposure, they are of no value after a radiological attack has occurred; however, there is the theoretical possibility that giving the drug might reduce the risks to life-saving rescuers before they enter an area where they might be exposed to very high doses.
ANNEX C: PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES (C1) Malicious actions, by definition, strive to provoke severe psychological reactions in the general public. Where radiation releases are concerned, distress will be common and manifest as sadness, anger, fear, insomnia, impaired ability to concentrate, and disbelief. Psychological distress after a radiological incident may also manifest as non-specific somatic complaints (a presentation sometimes referred to as multiple idiopathic physical symptoms). General healthcare providers should manage these people. Some individuals may exhibit behavioural changes such as decreasing travel, staying home, refusing to send children to school, and increasing substance use and abuse. Fortunately, for the vast majority of people, distress and psychological and behavioural symptoms related to the traumatic event exposure will diminish over time.
(C2) For others, however, symptoms will persist, affect function at home and work, and may result in psychiatric illness. While acute stress disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are the disorders most people think of in connection with trauma, major depression, increased substance use, family conflict, and generalised anxiety disorder are also encountered.
(C3) It is important to remember that people with no prior history of psychiatric illness are vulnerable to psychiatric illness after a malicious exposure. In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, nearly 40% of those who developed PTSD and depression had no previous psychiatric disorder. People at high risk of developing psychiatric disorders include: (i) those directly exposed (e.g. people near the blast and those participating in rescue and recovery operations of people and remains); (ii) those who were more vulnerable before the event due to existing mental illness; and (iii) those who suffered resource losses and disruption of their social supports after the event.
(C4) Following a malicious event, people will likely turn to healthcare providers for information and guidance. Following the 2001 anthrax attacks, for example, 77% of a representative sample of Americans reported that they would trust their own doctor most when seeking a reliable source of information. Healthcare providers would likely play a key role in determining how the general public respond to a radiological malicious event. A well-organised, effective medical response will instil hope and confidence, reduce fear and anxiety, and support the continuity of basic community functions.
(C5) Addressing psychological and behavioural issues following a radiological attack may be far more challenging, in terms of the number of people affected, than addressing the consequences of radiation exposure in the affected population. Symptoms of depression, bereavement, family conflict, and somatisation will be much more common than PTSD. Increased smoking and increased alcohol use can be expected, at least in the short term. Sleep disturbance, hypervigilance, decreased concentration, and uncertainty are other early symptoms of psychological distress. People with multiple somatic complaints may have physical illness or they may show distress, depression, and/or demoralisation.
(C6) Responding to the mental health needs of the community as a whole raises many challenges. In the immediate aftermath of an event, the affected community is likely to draw together, but over time, contaminated communities may manifest anger or reduced cohesiveness, low morale, and decreased social service due to distress and economic losses. Handouts on stress and fear management techniques and activities should be prepared for distribution. Contamination of food supplies call for long-term education and potential health surveillance. Public health outreach to senior citizens will be important since their distress may heighten their social withdrawal. Door-to-door contact programmes for this group and those with chronic medical needs who stay at home will be needed. Establishment of a clinical registry and appropriate health surveillance may have important psychological benefits for affected communities. People who have their contact information recorded in a database will feel more assured that follow-up will be available.
(C7) Relocation of families out of zones of exclusion is complicated and requires particular attention to familial needs and social justice. Maximising the relocation choices of families is important. Some (perhaps 10%) will not want to move under any circumstances. Many of those for whom relocation is not recommended will leave voluntarily. Still others, who might prefer to move, will be unable to do so due to reasons of employment or an inability to sell their homes in what is likely to be a depressed housing market. The perception of inequity in these and other matters will stress social fault lines and may divide communities.
C.1. Communication between care providers and patients
(C8) The imperceptibility of low-level radiation exposures may cause many people to develop persistent health concerns or to arbitrarily link idiopathic symptoms to benign or improbable exposures [even under normal circumstances, one-third of primary care people assist with medically unexplained physical symptoms (e.g. idiopathic fatigue and pain)]. Over 90% of the general population will visit their primary care provider each year, making primary care a crucial setting for dissemination of accurate health risk information following suspected radiological exposures to the community.
(C9) In the aftermath of a radiation release, primary care providers should make an effort to determine the degree of exposure suffered by all people visiting their clinics, regardless of the reason. In some circumstances, this determination will be assisted by the use of biodosimetry, but more commonly, it will be based simply on a personÕs proximity to the event and subsequent location during a critical period of exposure. Based on this initial primary assessment of exposure, the presence or absence of symptoms, and the presence or absence of disease (medical and psychiatric), people may be assigned to categories for treatment, follow-up, and education. Counselling may be provided on risk, symptoms, and/or disease findings. Assessment for PTSD, depression or anxiety, and altered alcohol or tobacco consumption are important.
(C10) After a radiation release, it may be useful for primary care clinics to routinely assess the degree of concern about exposure-related illness, separate from actual exposures. This process can be facilitated by asking, ÔIs your visit today related to terrorism or radiation concerns?Õ at the beginning of every visit. People who respond ÔyesÕ or ÔmaybeÕ to this question or who express concern about exposure-related illness should receive extra primary care assessment to elucidate the nature of their expectations and goals for the medical visit. These concerns and expectations can then guide medical triage and the intensity of risk communication efforts.
(C11) Often the primary care provider will have the most difficulty in communicating with those who are: (i) possibly exposed but unconcerned and with no symptoms or disease; or (ii) either exposed or unexposed with a high level of concern but asymptomatic (no symptoms or disease) or unexplained symptoms. The latter group is often categorised as having multiple idiopathic physical symptoms. People who were possibly exposed but who are unconcerned with no symptoms or disease will deny or neglect personal medical needs. Assuming medical needs are subacute, information should be entered into a local registry to facilitate follow-up to ensure that people have attended appropriately to injuries and exposures. Exposed or unexposed people with high levels of concern but who are asymptomatic will amplify concerns and repeatedly resist clinician reassurance. In a mass casualty situation, these people can disrupt provision of critical medical care; therefore, it may be helpful to plan for this by dedicating staff and an area to their care. Development of a contact registry with dedicated efforts to provide follow-up contact and care is one way of communicating compassion and concern without succumbing to risky or unnecessary testing. Research suggests that a negative test offers only transient reassurance and can sometimes increase illness concerns, especially when subsequent false-positive results occur. Discussing the basis for peopleÕs concerns and exploring which tests a person thinks he/she might need prevents many people from feeling that such concerns have been ignored. Time-contingent follow-up (planned rather than as-needed visits) reduces illness worry, increases satisfaction with care, and may mitigate downstream litigation conflicts and concerns. As with asymptomatic, concerned people, people who are either exposed or unexposed with high levels of concern and unexplained symptoms or people with idiopathic symptoms can disrupt delivery of critical medical care. These people may invoke more clinician anxiety because, unlike the people with isolated concerns, they are often visibly suffering and their symptoms may sound potentially catastrophic (e.g. chest pain and sweating).
(C12) In addition to a dedicated area, staffing, contact registry, and intensified primary care follow-up efforts, intervention for people concerned with unexplained symptoms should involve brochures, fact sheets, and literature about self-management approaches to medically unexplained symptoms. In an acute crisis, it is helpful to triage these people in an area distinct from the area used to care for acutely ill individuals, but the area should not be labelled or perceived as a Ôpsychiatric careÕ area for Ôworried wellÕ people because of the sense of stigmatisation that such labels generate. People with unexplained symptoms should therefore receive early and frequent validation from the clinician that symptoms are important and will be followed-up quickly and carefully.
C.2. Debriefing
(C13) Physical safety and security of the public and relief workers must take first priority. After safety is assured, other interventions such as debriefing may begin. Debriefing is a popular early intervention following disasters, in which small groups of people involved in the disaster, such as rescue workers, meet in a single lengthy session to share individual feelings and experiences. Some of these issues might be considered at the planning stage.
